Lessons from Black Monday
Euro Pacific Capital
By Peter Schiff
October 22, 2012
25
years ago, on another Monday in late October, the financial world
seemed to disintegrate in a heartbeat. Though the 205 point drop in the
Dow last Friday (the technical anniversary of the '87 Crash) was
somewhat reminiscent of its 108-point drop on Friday, October 16, 1987,
the real action in '87 was on the Monday that followed. And while this
Monday is not nearly as black, it is important that we use the
opportunity to recall the circumstances that nearly sent the stock
market into cardiac arrest.
While there were technical reasons
that allowed the snowball to gather so much mass, it was major economic
problems that started it rolling. Those issues remain to this day, but
have grown much, much larger. But while they terrified the market 25
years ago, they don't rate a second look today. Whether investors have
gotten wise, or merely oblivious, is the question we should be asking.
Though
most simply remember the 1987 Crash as one panicked selling day, Black
Monday was just the largest drop in a string of bad days. On the
Wednesday before, the Dow sold off 95 points (then a record) and dropped
another 58 points on the Thursday. On Friday the selling got worse,
with the Dow setting another record with a 108 point drop. After
thinking about it over the weekend, investors decided to preserve what
remained of their gains by selling on Monday. Unfortunately, everyone
got the same idea at the same time.
It is true that the Crash
was in some ways a technical phenomenon. As of August of 1987, stocks
had surged 75% from January 1986, and 40% from January 1987. After such
an upswing, it was inevitable that investors were on edge. Rather than
taking profits, many on Wall Street instead hedged their positions using
the new, and largely untested, trading programs that were designed to
put a floor under losses if the markets turned south. But when the
selling came in waves, the machines went into overdrive. Selling begat
selling and an automated rout ensued. When the dust settled, the Dow was
down 22% in a single day.
If that was all there was to the
story, we would be left with a neat cautionary tale about the folly of
placing too much faith in machines. But that is a distracting sideshow.
In truth, the market was spooked by concerns over international trade
and government debt, which then became known as the "twin deficits."
After widening earlier in the 80's, investors had hoped that these gaps
would come under control. But as Ronald Reagan's second term wore on,
those hopes faded.
From 1982 to 1986, the U.S. trade deficit
had expanded 475%from $24 billion to $138 billion. Most economists
blamed the trend on the dollar gains in the early 1980's, which had
apparently made U.S. products uncompetitive. As it was assumed that a
weakened dollar would solve the problem, in 1985 the leading western
democracies and Japan announced the Plaza Accords to systematically push
down the dollar against the Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark. By
1987, the plan had "succeeded" devaluing the dollar 51% against the yen.
But by the second half of that year it became apparent that the Plaza
Accord had failed in its real mission to cut down on the U.S. trade
deficit. Despite the plunging dollar, the deficit expanded that year by
another 10% to $152 billion.
At
around that time, the U.S. government budget deficits also became a
major concern. Everyone remembers Ronald Reagan as a small government
champion, but many conveniently forget that he presided over a
significant expansion in government spending. Federal deficits rose 199%
from 1980 ($74 billion) to 1986 ($221 billion). Although the deficit
came down to $150 billion in 1987, many were frustrated that it remained
stubbornly high by historic standards.
As early as August of
1987, concern over the twin deficits, which together accounted for 6.4%
of the nation's $4.76 trillion GDP became critical. Given the prior run
up in stocks, this was enough to convince many investors to head towards
the exits. Before Black Monday (October 19), the Dow had already
declined 18% from its August peak.
When
we look back at those events from the current perspective, it almost
seems comical. Government deficits now approach $1.5 trillion annually
and annual trade deficits exceed $500 billion. Today's twin deficits now
add up to more than 13% of current GDP (twice the level of 1987). But
today's investors are largely untroubled. Oftentimes news of a falling
dollar and wider deficits will spark a stock rally, and the issues
barely rate a mention in a presidential debate.
Are
investors today simply more sophisticated than they were then? Have
they lost an irrational fear of deficits? To the contrary, I believe
that we have arrived at a point where money printing and government
stimulus has replaced manufacturing and private sector productivity as
the foundation of our economy (see my lead commentary in the October
2012 edition of the Euro Pacific Global Investor Newsletter for more on this). As a result, most investors are now blind to the
dangers of deficits. But that does not mean that they don't exist.
When
America's creditors wake up, particularly those foreign governments now
shouldering the lion's share of the burden, concerns over our twin
deficits will return with a vengeance. As the problems now loom larger
than ever, so too will the economic and market implications when the
issues come to a head. Interest rates will surge and the dollar will
fall. But the U.S. economy is not nearly as well equipped as in 1987 to
withstand the stresses. Given the relative size of our imbalances, the
manner in which they are being financed, and the diminished state of our
manufacturing sector, higher interest rates and a weaker dollar will
exact a much greater toll.
Despite this, I do not believe that
the stock market is as vulnerable to another Black Monday. With the
Federal Reserve so committed to its current course of quantitative
easing, it seems to me unlikely that they will allow such a steep
one-day drop. Also, with bond yields so low, domestic investors are
currently presented with fewer attractive options. If anything, the next
Black Monday is more likely to occur in the currency and/or bond
markets, with safe haven flows moving into gold not treasuries.
(c) Euro Pacific Capital

