Promises, Promises
Euro Pacific Capital
By John Browne
August 7, 2012
In
the last week of July, ECB President Mario Draghi attracted investor
interest worldwide by saying that he would do "whatever it takes" to
solve the Eurozone crisis and, in the process, save the euro. Markets
rallied as investors concluded that Mr. Draghi could only be referring
to the financial heroine of quantitative easing (QE) and the transfer of
toxic Eurozone sovereign debt assets from troubled private banks to EU
taxpayers. This mini rally built on momentum that had previously been
fueled by belief that Fed Chairman Bernanke would imminently announce a
further round of QE in the United States.
Given
the record of Central bankers for encouraging hopes that invariably
have proved fruitless, it was surprising how international financial
markets appeared to be taken for yet another ride. But addiction is
powerful and financial heroine is little different to the real thing in
its ability to fire optimism.
True
to form, neither banker delivered the goods. On August 1st, Bernanke
disappointed markets by failing to announce any QE despite offering a
gloomy economic outlook. Stock markets wavered, but hung their hopes on
Draghi. But the next day the ECB made vague promises of future actions
but offered no definitive actions. Financial markets were deeply
disappointed. The euro fell as Italian bond yields surged. In the United
States, the Dow fell by almost two hundred points at one stage.
In
order to lessen the anti-climax, Draghi feigned amazement that his July
26th statement had received so much attention. It was a display of
arrogance typical of the Anglo-American led central banks. However,
despite denying the markets the red meat that they most wanted, Draghi
encouraged further anticipation in three important areas.
First,
he undertook to 'address' the problem set by the ECB, insisting on
'seniority' over all other bondholders when making loans to Eurozone
governments. Any yielding on this point will involve all EU citizens,
including Germans, in greater sovereign risk. Second, Draghi said he
'may' undertake open market operations (QE) in amounts that would make
an impact on Eurozone finances. Third, he made it clear that his
'intention' is to have the ECB buy toxic sovereign debt in secondary
markets in tandem with the European Security Mechanism (ESM). This would
appear to slide around the EU treaty rules forbidding any direct
subsidies to member nations by the ECB.
In
recent years, Euro politicians have shown themselves clearly willing to
override any law and to adopt any suspect tricks to further their aims.
However, on September 12th, the German Constitutional Court will decide
on German participation in the various legal gimmicks that have been
concocted to short circuit constitutional roadblocks. In the past, this
Court has shown itself to be no pushover.
Germany
is the economic and political powerhouse of the EU, and the Eurozone.
Germans disapprove of QE and bailouts for what they see as irresponsible
Eurozone nations. Furthermore, German voters have encouraged their
politicians to veto the Eurozone's proposal that the ECB be granted a
carte blanche license to print money and add even more debt to an
already chronic debt problem. In concluding that Draghi will ultimately
deliver the interventions, observers miss three crucial factors.
First,
the ECB has a governing council of 23 members. According to the Italian
daily, La Republica,seven (30%) of the members disapproved of further
Eurozone sovereign bond buying by the ECB. A further four members were
undecided. This leaves only 12 members, including Draghi's deciding
vote, or 52 percent who are positive in support.
Second,
the German central bank is by far the richest in Europe and disapproves
of the ECB yielding its 'senior' creditor position and also the
proposition that the ESM 'bailout' mechanism is granted a banking
license.
Third,
the Eurozone economic problem, like that facing the United States,
essentially is one of solvency, not liquidity. Nothing that Draghi has
suggested addresses this issue. Solvency is a political problem over
which bankers are impotent.
Based
on his recent exchanges with Senators and Congressmen, Fed Chairman
Bernanke has realized that the same situation faces the United States.
This likely makes him less enthusiastic about the unleashing of more QE
policies that have thus far failed to deliver real growth. However, both
Draghi and Bernanke know that markets need to be talked up, and they
continue to do so unapologetically.
Enormous
pressure likely is being exerted on the Fed and ECB by politicians,
bankers and overblown financial markets that appear increasingly
desperate for more cheap easy money. However, it is likely that the Fed
and especially the German influenced ECB will either be unable or
unwilling to deliver the easy option on the massive size that markets
expect.
(c) Euro Pacific Capital

